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ABSTRACT
Service composition is the act of taking several component prod-
ucts or services, and bundling them together to meet the needs of
a given customer. In the future, service composition will play an
increasingly important role in e-commerce, and automation will be
desirable to improve speed and efﬁciency of customer response. In
this paper, we consider a service composition agent that both buys
components and sells services through auctions. It buys compo-
nent services by participating in many English auctions. It sells
composite services by participating in Request-for-Quotes reverse
auctions. Because it does not hold a long-term inventory of com-
ponent services, it must take risks; it must make offers in reverse
auctions prior to purchasing all the components needed, and must
bid in English auctions prior to having a guaranteed customer for
the composite good. We present algorithms that is able to man-
age this risk, by appropriately bidding/offering in many auctions
and reverse auctions simultaneously. The algorithms will withdraw
from one set of possible auctions and move to another set if this
will produce a better-expected outcome, but will effectively man-
age the risk of accidentally winning outstanding bids/offers during
the withdrawal process. We illustrate the behavior of these algo-
rithms through a set of worked examples.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.1 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Applications and Expert Systems;
I.2.8 [Artiﬁcial Intelligence]: Problem Solving, Control Methods,
and Search
General Terms
Algorithms
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Service Composition, Auctions, Bidding, Agent
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, Electronic Commerce has become an
increasingly central part of the economy. An Internet presence is
considered an essential part of doing business, rather than an exotic
add-on to a company. More and more transactions, both from busi-
ness to consumer and between businesses, are taking place online.
Simple ﬁxed cost business transactions are often automated at one
or both ends, and auctions are overwhelmingly conducted by auto-
mated auctioneer software. Agent technology has been proposed as
a means of automating some of the more sophisticated negotiations
which businesses are involved in (e.g. [11]). In this paper we look
at a speciﬁc class of business process that will become increasingly
important in the virtual economy - service composition. We focus
speciﬁcally on algorithms that simultaneously purchase component
services from a group of auctions, and sell composite services via
reverse auctions.
Over the last decade, companies have focused more and more on
their core competencies, by outsourcing non-core activities to other
companies. This trend is beginning to have an impact on many
E-businesses, as well as traditional bricks-and-mortar companies.
Companies would like to be able to outsource some of their activi-
ties over the Internet. Initially, this has focused on semi-permanent
arrangements, with the web acting as an intermediary. For exam-
ple, career guidance information can be provided to employees of a
large company via a web-based third party. However, as this trend
is becoming increasingly important, much research and develop-
ment effort has been focusing on a more dynamic, service-centric
view of the Internet. Web Services are virtual entities that pro-
vide a service over the network through an open standard interface.
The service may be information, such as the latest stock prices, or
may be a virtual representation of some physical good or activity,
such as a contract to transport a crate from one location to another.
Because the service is offered through an open standard interface,
any client familiar with this standard can use it. Furthermore, the
output from one service can be fed directly into another service.
This makes the creation of composite services and complex busi-
nessprocesseswhichcross-organizationalboundariespossible. Po-
tentially, this can be done automatically and dynamically, and agent
technology will play a key role in this.
This leads to the emergence of an important role in the virtual
economy - the service composer. As companies focus on their core
competencies, other companies can focus on creating composite
packages. This is not new - travel agents, among others, have done
exactly that for years - but what is new is that it will be able to take
place dynamically, automatically, over the Internet.In this paper, we consider a service composition agent that both
buys components and sells services through auctions. It buys com-
ponent services by participating in many English auctions. It sells
composite services by participating in Request-for-Quotes reverse
auctions. Because it does not hold a long-term inventory of com-
ponent services, it must take risks; it must make offers in reverse
auctions prior to purchasing all the components needed, and must
bid in English auctions prior to having a guaranteed customer for
the composite good. In section §2, we describe the problems fac-
ing such an agent, and in section §3, we present an example service
composition scenario involving a virtual company, “FreightMixer”.
In §4, we present algorithms which is able to manage this risk, by
appropriately bidding/offering in many auctions and reverse auc-
tions simultaneously. The algorithms will withdraw from one set
of possible auctions and move to another set if this will produce
a better-expected outcome, but will effectively manage the risk of
accidentally winning outstanding bids/offers during the withdrawal
process. In section §4.5 we illustrate the behavior of these algo-
rithms through a set of worked examples. We then discuss related
work (Section §5) and present our conclusions and future work
(Section §6).
2. SERVICE COMPOSITION
Service composition is the act of purchasing several component
services, combining them, and selling them as a single composite
service. The service composer responsible for the generation of
the composite service must purchase the component services from
a group of suppliers and will sell the composite service to one or
more customers. In §3, we will give a detailed example of a com-
pany responsible for shipping freight. The company, FreightMixer,
is the service composer. It competes in Request-For-Quotes re-
verse auctions to supply customers with freight shipment services,
for example from London to San Francisco. However, it does not
own any cargo facilities of its own. Instead, it subcontracts, and
arranges cargo space on a set of linked ﬂights. The airlines run-
ning these ﬂights are the suppliers, and the individual ﬂights are
the component services.
A service composer, therefore, may be simultaneously interact-
ing with many potential customers and many potential suppliers.
This affects its behavior throughout the business lifecycle (see [19]
for more details). In this paper, we focus particularly on the de-
cision problem it faces during negotiation. To operate effectively,
the service composer will be involved in many interlinked negoti-
ations, and must make tradeoffs between them as they progress. It
will be negotiating with one or more potential purchasers in an ef-
fort to agree a price to supply a given service. While it is doing this,
it will need to determine what bundle of component services are re-
quired to meet each customers needs, and negotiate with suppliers
of these component services to determine what price to purchase
them at. For any single bundle of base service types the composer
will be involved in at least one, but more likely many, negotiations
to acquire instances of each service type. Furthermore, it may be
possible to meet the customer’s needs with a variety of alternative
bundles. The service composer may simultaneously negotiate to
purchase alternative bundles, in an effort to ﬁnd which bundle is
best.
In an ideal world, from the service composer’s perspective, it
would be able to make provisional agreements in all these negotia-
tions without making any binding commitment. This would allow
it to negotiate a provisional price with a customer and then go to
the suppliers to negotiate the cheapest bundle of components to
provide that service. If the proﬁt margin between the provisional
sale price and the proposed bundle purchase price was adequate,
it would make an agreement with the suppliers of that bundle and
conﬁrm the agreement with the customer. By doing this, the ser-
vice composer is never at risk of purchasing components it cannot
use, or of committing to a composite service it cannot provide.
However, intermediaries are rarely in a position to dictate the
wayinwhichnegotiationwillbecarriedout(i.e. themarketmecha-
nism). Nowadays, reverse auctions are becoming increasingly pop-
ular with large customers, to encourage visible competition within
a group of potential suppliers of a service. In a reverse auction, po-
tential suppliers must offer prices, undercutting the lowest current
offer. An offer is binding if the auction closes and it is the lowest.
If a composer places an offer prior to securing the required com-
ponents, there is a risk that it may win and be forced to supply the
service at a loss or default on the contract.
Componentservicesmaybeavailableatﬁxed, guaranteed, prices.
However, thereisanincreasinglylargemarketsellingsurplusgoods
and services off cheaply via English auctions. If a composer does
not use such a source, then a competitor may be able to undercut
its prices. However, if it does participate in auctions, any bid is a
potential commitment to purchase. Hence, placing such a bid is a
risk if it does not have a guaranteed customer. A service composer
therefore needs to place bids in auctions, offers in reverse auctions,
and make purchases from ﬁxed-price suppliers in such a way as
to balance risk against potential gain. By making an offer in a re-
verse auction before securing the necessary component services or
placing a bid for a component before having a guaranteed sale, the
service composer takes a risk. However by doing so it may gain by
having an increased chance of winning a deal or a reduced cost of
securing a component. The algorithm presented in this paper is de-
signedto makethistradeoff, andadjust appropriatelyas negotiation
progresses.
3. FREIGHTMIXER: AN EXAMPLE SCE-
NARIO
As a motivating example, we now present a scenario that demon-
strates the need for sophisticated simultaneous negotiation in both
forward and reverse auctions. FreightMixer is an imaginary trans-
port company that ships goods around the world on behalf of cus-
tomers. Unlike some other transport companies, it owns no trans-
port infrastructure. Instead, it exploits cheap last-minute sales of
excess hold space to meet the needs of its customers. Because it
cannot guarantee that hold space will be available on a particular
route, it may connect together several ﬂight legs to get the package
to its destination. While it may not be the quickest service, it aims
to be the cheapest. Electronic marketplaces are both a source of
resources (individual ﬂight legs) and a channel for products (com-
posite ﬂights for a given customer).
FreightMixer acts in two distinct sets of markets:
In the markets for end-to-end cargo services, it acts as a poten-
tial seller. It observes the advertised requirements of potential cus-
tomers. Usually, customers will conduct reverse auctions (or Re-
quest For Quotes, which are informal reverse auctions).
In the markets for hold space on ﬂights (and possibly ships), it
acts as a potential buyer. It observes the availability and cost of dif-
ferent options in these markets. Some sellers will sell hold space at
a ﬁxed price, while others will conduct English auctions to dispose
of excess space.
In its role as service composer, it must (a) understand require-
mentsofthepotentialcustomerswhicharecurrentlyrequestingser-
vices in the end-to-end cargo markets, and identify a service whichcould meet their needs (b) identify the alternative ways this service
can be created from component services (i.e. hold space on speciﬁc
ﬂights) (c) identify potential sellers of these component services in
the markets for hold space on ﬂights.
By analyzing the various markets, FreightMixer can determine
potential trading options. Each option will consist of the following:
• A potential buyer, or set of buyers, who are currently request-
ing a service in the end-to-end cargo marketplaces.
• A service speciﬁcation which meets the needs of these buy-
ers.
• One or more alternate decompositions of this service into
component services.
• A list of sellers in the markets for hold space who are offer-
ing to sell individual component services appearing in these
decompositions.
For example, suppose that FreightMixer observes a Request For
Quotes reverse auction for sending a 1 tonne crate from London to
San Francisco, with the best offer currently at 230, and a second
reverse auction for sending a 1 tonne crate from London to Los
Angeles, with the best offer currently at 260. Using its database of
service models, Freightmixer identiﬁes alternative combinations of
ﬂights that might potentially meet these needs. It identiﬁes a direct
route from London(LHR) to San Francisco(SFO), and also iden-
tiﬁes alternative routes via Chicago(ORD), New York(JFK) and
Boston(BOS). It ﬁnds no appropriate direct ﬂight from LHR to Los
Angeles(LAX), but ﬁnds ﬂights from Chicago to Los Angeles and
from San Francisco to Los Angeles. It then checks the auctions
for excess hold space and ﬁnds that appropriate auctions exist for
all legs except LHR to JFK. Each auction is for exactly 1 tonne of
hold space. The alternatives it has are shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Graph of services
Hence, FreightMixer has an option consisting of the reverse auc-
tion for a shipment {LHR-SFO}, three alternative ways of gener-
ating the required service from component services ({LHR-SFO},
{LHR-ORD & ORD-SFO} or {LHR-BOS & BOS-SFO}) and po-
tential sellers for each of the component services. It also has an op-
tion consisting of the reverse auction for a shipment {LHR-LAX},
and 4 alternative ways for generating the component services (e.g.
{LHR-SFO & SFO-LAX} or {LHR-ORD & ORD-LAX}).
FreightMixer must now decide whether to enter into negotia-
tion with the potential customers and potential suppliers, and if so,
which offers and bids should it place. Should it attempt to win both
contracts, or just one? How should it place its bids and offers to
maximize the likely proﬁt? In the following section, we present
an algorithm that is able to make such decisions. Then, in section
§4.5, we return to our example to illustrate the decisions the algo-
rithm makes.
4. SPECIFICATION OF A NEGOTIATION
ALGORITHM FOR PURCHASING SER-
VICE BUNDLES
We now present an algorithm to automate the decision problem
faced by Freightmixer and other service composers. We make cer-
tain assumptions on the nature of the environment in which it oper-
ates:
• We assume that all transactions take place through English
auctions, reverse auctions and ﬁxed-price sales. We do not
currently consider one-to-one negotiation or double auctions.
• We assume that there are a sufﬁciently large number of buy-
ers and sellers, and sufﬁcient stability in the environment, to
allow statistical proﬁles of expected outcomes in auctions to
be built.
We ﬁrst present the decision problem the agent is faced with and
then present the speciﬁcation of an algorithm to perform service
composition in this environment. We also present a simpliﬁed form
which is more efﬁcient, together a with pseudo-code design.
4.1 Speciﬁcation of the Decision Problem
We assume our agent is participating in a set of auctions, A.
These auctions all start at roughly the same time, but may ﬁnish
at different times. Some of these auctions are forward auctions,
selling a single good or service, while others are reverse auctions,
requiring a single good or service.
The forward auctions are English auctions with a ﬁxed closing
time. Participants can place bids at any time, provided the new bid
is a minimum increment, , above the last bid. We choose units in
which this minimum increment is 1
1. At the closing time, the good
or service for sale is sold to the highest bidder at the price they bid.
We also assume that the bid increment of each auction is very small
with respect to the value of the good or service for sale.
The reverse auctions are reverse English auctions with a ﬁxed
closing time. Participants can place offers at any time, provided
the new offer is a minimum decrement, chosen to be 1 as above,
below the last bid. At the closing time, the lowest offerer is given
a contract to provide the required good or service at the price they
offered.
To simplify the mathematical notation used later in this section,
we model reverse auctions as ’negative’ English auctions. A con-
tract to provide a good g is represented as the sale of a negative
good, g. Participants place negative bids, which must increase (i.e.
move towards zero) by at least the minimum bid increment. We
1We make this choice for ease of presentation.  might be different
in different auctions. Handling different values of  would compli-
cate the presentation, but not fundamentally change the algorithmalso model ﬁxed-price sellers as auctions with a known and certain
closing price.
The technology, T, of the agent consists of a set of rewrite rules,
each with an associated cost. The rewrite rules are of the form
({a} ⇐ {b1,...,bn},c), where a,b1,...,bn are goods. The rule is
read as stating that the agent has the technology to generate good
a from the bag of goods {b1,...,bn} at a cost of c. (We consider
this as a bag, not a set, of goods as a composite service may use
several identical components. ) We also add to T all rules of the
form (∅ ⇐ {g,g},0) for all goods g. These rules represent the fact
that the agent can satisfy a contract g if they are able to generate a
good g.
Given a bag of goods G, we say that G
0 is a one-step rewrite of
G at cost c if:
(A ⇐ B,c) ∈ T, B ⊆ G, and G
0 = A ∪ G \ B
We say that G
n is a rewrite of G at cost c(G
n) if it is a one-
step rewrite of G at cost c, or there is some rewrite G
n−1 of G
at cost c(G
n−1) such that G
n is a one-step rewrite of G
n−1 at cost
c(G
n)−c(G
n−1). The deﬁnition holds for n ≥ 1, with G
0 := G.
Note that the rewrite relationship is not symmetric. Moreover,
we make the assumption that applying successive rewrites to a bag
of goods will never result in the original bag. That is @G s.t. G
n =
G, ∀n > 0.
Let W(G) be the set of all rewrites of G.
To each bag of goods G in the domain of interest we associate a
number v(G), the exogenous valuation to the agent of these goods.
This deﬁnes the value the agent receives from making use of these
goods (and contracts, represented by negative goods) outside the
auction environment explicitly represented. The exogenous valua-
tion of a good may be positive, if it is easy to sell on and has an ex-
pected market price. It may be negative, representing the dumping
cost, or zero, if the good has no value but can be freely disposed
of. The valuation of a supply contract, g will be negative, repre-
senting the cost of fulﬁlling the contract on the open market, or the
de-commitment penalty associated with dropping the contract.
In the service composition environment, we expect the exoge-
nous valuation of goods and contracts to be poor and most of the
agent’s proﬁt to be made through sales in the reverse auctions. It is
in the interests of the agent, therefore, to buy bundles in which the
agent’s technology can pair contracts won in reverse auctions with
compositions of goods won in forward auctions.
The valuation V (G) of a given bag of goods, G, is given by:
V (G) = max
G0∈W(G)
(v(G
0) − c(G
0))
In other words, it is the valuation produced by optimum applica-
tion of the agent’s technology on G.
We deﬁne a bid set
2 to be a pair (A,p), where A ⊂ A and
p : A → Z is a price function, representing the price the agent is
bidding in each auction in A.
The “utility” to the agent of winning a bid set (A,p) is
u(A,p) = V (A) −
X
a∈A
p(a).
Our agent maintains a probabilistic model of the expected out-
comes of each auction, based on past performance of similar auc-
tions.
2Technically, it is a ’bid and offer set’, but for ease of presentation
we refer to it as the bid set and refer to all bids/offers as bids.
To each auction a ∈ A is associated a price distribution Pa :
Z → [0,1] representing the belief that, with probability Pa(p),
auction a will close at price p. We set Fa(p) =
P
p0≥p Pa(p
0): the
agent’s believed probability that auction a will close at or above
price p. For subsets A ⊂ A we deﬁne PA(p) to be the believed
probability that the auctions in A will close at the prices speciﬁed
by a price function p : A → Z:
PA(p) =
Y
a∈A
Pa(p(a)), (1)
and likewise FA, the probability that that the auctions in A will
close at or above the prices speciﬁed by p:
FA(p) =
Y
a∈A
Fa(p(a)). (2)
If the price in auction a is q, then the agent believes that the proba-
bility of a bid at price p ≥ q winning is
Pwin(a,p,q) :=
Pa(p)
Fa(q)
. (3)
Similarly, for a collection of auctions A with current prices q :
A → R, the probability of the auctions closing at prices p is
Pwin(A,p,q) =
PA(p)
FA(q)
. (4)
We model a ﬁxed-price seller, which will guarantee a sale of a
givengoodatapricep, asanauctionwith100%certaintyofclosing
at p.
4.2 Speciﬁcation of the algorithm
We now consider how the agent can use these beliefs to calcu-
late information about expected future utility of deals it may win.
Firstly, we deﬁne the notion of the expected utility E(B,A,q) of
a set of auctions B, given a set of observed prices q, and given that
the agent holds active bids in auctions A.
E(B,A,q) = V (B) − C(B ∩ A,q) − C(B \ A,q + 1) (5)
where the function C(S,q
0) is the expected cost of winning the
auctions S at prices greater than or equal to q
0:
C(S,q
0) =
X
p0≥q0
X
a∈S
Pwin(a,p
0(a),q
0(a))p
0(a) (6)
The expected utility of a set of auctions is thus the value of the
bundle, minus the expected cost of winning each of the auctions.
The latter is calculated by using the believed probability that the
auction will ﬁnish at each given price, if our agent places a bid at
that price. We restrict p
0 > q for auctions B \A, in (5) because we
know that the agent does not hold bids in these auctions at prices
q, and so has no probability of winning at these prices.
The expression (5) gives us some idea of the intrinsic value of
a bundle of goods B, but is not the expected return for placing a
single bid in the auctions in B. In general such a bid does not have
an expected return: we must reason over complete strategies.
Consider the expected value (given that prices are currently q,
and the agent holds the active bids A) of the following strategy,
which we call “commitment to B”: The agent chooses a set of
auctions B, and for all future time steps, will always bid on any
elements of B in which it does not hold active bids. If the agent
sticks to this commitment, then we know its future choices, and so
precise formulae for expected return can be calculated.Let S be a possible set of auctions that the agent may win using
this strategy: B ⊂ S ⊂ A ∪ B. The probability that the auctions
S \ B will not be outbid, while the auctions A \ S are, is
Pret(S,A,q) =
FA\S(q + 1)PS\B(q)
FA\B(q)
Given this eventuality, the expected utility is evaluated in the same
way as (5), except that instead of V (B), the value we obtain is
V (S), and we occur additional costs for each auction in S \B that
we win.
It follows that the expected value for following the commitment
to B is:
Ec(B,A,q) = E(B,A,q)+
+
X
B⊂S⊂A∪B
Pret(S,A,q)

V (S) − V (B) −
X
a∈S\B
q(a)

(7)
The terms in this expression for which S = B are the desired
outcomes. The other terms correspond to obtaining some non-
emptycollectionS\B ofgoodsthatdonotcontributetoourdesired
bundle B. Although they could still provide positive value, it is an-
ticipated that in the service composition arena, where goods tend to
complement one another, the slight increase of V (S) with respect
to V (B) will not be large enough to compensate for the increase
in costs
P
a∈S\B q(a), and each of these terms would have a neg-
ative impact on the expected value of the commitment. This will
certainly be the case for negative goods appearing in S \ B, repre-
senting the possible winning of a reverse auction not appearing in
our desired bundle (and therefore the need to satisfy it on the open
market or to pay the de-commitment penalty).
The algorithm (COMPOSER) we propose is that at each time step
the agent calculates the commitment B which has largest expected
utility Ec(B,A,q) given the currently held bids A and prices q,
and places the minimal bids required to take the lead in B \ A.
In practice this means it will initially identify the set of options
which maximize its a-priori expected utility. These options will
consist of a reverse auction for a given composite service, together
with a set of English auctions for the required components. It will
place bids in these forward/reverse auctions and will continue to
compete in these auctions, placing more bids when outbid. How-
ever, if sufﬁcient competing bids are placed to reduce the expected
utility of this set of auctions, then it may change to another set of
auctions which can generate the same composite service. It will
do this if the expected gain from changing to this new bundle out-
weighs the expected cost of currently held bids which appear in the
old bundle but not in the new bundle. If competing bids are placed
in one of the reverse auctions it is participating in, and the expected
value of that auction decreases sufﬁciently it may withdraw from
that reverse auction. It may use the associated forward auctions in
another option, or may withdraw from them as well.
There are two obvious problems with this algorithm:
• By its very nature, our algorithm does not in fact commit,
sinceitre-evaluatesitsoptionsateachopportunity. However,
the value Ec(B,A,q), which is truly the expected value of
committing to bid on B, and hence is not the expected value
according to the speciﬁed algorithm, is none-the-less (we
claim) a good indication of the optimal choice to make. The
estimate we use is conservative, in that the agent chooses a
single bundle that will give the best overall expected utility.
Choosing a different bundle for each possible outcome can
only improve on this. We have adopted this approach ini-
tially, as we believe that it will provide good performance in
the majority of situations. Experimentation and further anal-
ysis will be necessary to test this hypothesis.
• In practice, if the number of auctions is large, it will be dif-
ﬁcult to evaluate equation (7) for every alternative bundle
given realistic computational resource bounds. Ideally, if we
had perfect information and unlimited computation time, we
would calculate this accurately. However, if the algorithm is
to be used in realistic circumstances, it is necessary to de-
velop a simpliﬁed version which is more tractable. We now
turn our attention to this problem.
4.3 Speciﬁcation of a simpliﬁed algorithm
We can improve the efﬁciency of the algorithm by making two
simplifying assumptions;
1. We do not consider every possible bundle of auctions, but
restrict our attention to a promising subset of these bundles.
We focus on only those bundles which can be transformed
using the production rules into the empty set, (the candidate
class).
2. When considering the expected utility of switching to a pos-
sible bundle, we ignore any utility gain of unplanned pur-
chase of items in S \ B, beyond their immediate exoge-
nous utility. (In other words, we ignore any utility gain from
the unplanned purchase of goods and contracts which satisfy
each other).
Theﬁrstassumptionisvalidifweassumethattheexogenousval-
uation of any good or set of goods will always be less than or equal
to their purchase price in the auctions we represent.
3 In this situa-
tion, no utility can be gained by purchasing a good or set of goods
for the purpose of disposing them outside the system represented.
Because of this, any set of auctions will always contain a subset
with equal or higher expected utility which can be transformed via
the rewrite rules into the empty set.
Note that this assumption can be made without loss of generality.
If a particular good b has an exogenous valuation v(b) which can at
times be greater than its purchase price in an auction, we can add an
endogenous ﬁxed-price buyer willing to purchase b for v(b) (this is
represented as an English auction for b with a 100% probability of
closing at −v(b)). If a set of goods {b1,...,bn} is super-additive
(i.e. v({b1,...,bn}) > v(b1) + ... + v(bn) we represent this as a
production rule ({q} ⇐ {b1,...,bn},0) together with a ﬁxed-price
buyer for q at v({b1,...,bn}).
The second assumption allows us to simplify equation (7) to be-
come:
Ec(B,A,q) = E(B,A,q) +
+
X
a∈A\B
Pwin(a,q(a),q(a)).(v(a) − q(a)) (8)
We believe that this is, in almost all circumstances, a good ap-
proximation for equation (7). It is very unlikely that an agent will
decide to withdraw from a reverse auction and set of forward auc-
tions able to satisfy it, and then win all the relevant auctions be-
cause no-one else bids in them. Hence the positive contribution of
3This also applies to negative goods - the cost of satisfying a con-
tract exogenously should be greater than or equal to the contract
price in a reverse auction.this serendipity to the expected utility will be small, so is safe to
ignore. Note that because of this, equation (8) will yield a value of
Ec slightly less than or equal to that given by equation (7).
These two assumptions greatly simplify the computation of the
optimal bid set. We no longer need to calculate the endogenous val-
uation of all bundles, only those in the candidate class. Calculation
of (8) for a given bundle only needs one endogenous valuation, as
opposed to the 2
|A\B| valuations required by (7).
Furthermore the candidate class of bundles, together with their
endogenous valuations, can be generated prior to participation in
the auctions (provided the set of auctions is known). It is sufﬁcient
to exhaustively backward-chain the rewrite rules from the empty
set, while simultaneously keeping track of the incremental cost of
transformation. This will generate all bundles which can be trans-
formed into the empty set, together with their cost of transforma-
tion. The (negative) endogenous valuation of a given bundle will
simply be the minimal cost of transformation to the empty set. We
now present an algorithm to carry this out.
4.4 Algorithm for the computation of the can-
didate bundle set and bundles valuation
The algorithm presented here computes all the candidate bun-
dles, while associating a valuation to the bundles. Let C be the
set of the candidate bundles and W and X be the working sets to
contain bundles that will end up in C after having generated other
candidate bundles. O is the bag of all offerings that are available
to the agent. Notice that the same basic component might appear
more than once in O. T is the technology: the set of the production
rules. Given a bag of goods, or bundle B, V (B) is the valuation of
the bundle. J(G) is the set of the justiﬁcations of for G. A justi-
ﬁcation for a bundle G is a couple (G
0,r) such that where G is a
rewrite of G
0 through r (see 4.1). Given a rule r ∈ T, c(r) is the
production cost associated to the rule.
C = ∅
V (∅) = 0
W = (∅)
For each offering o ∈ O
For each bundle G ∈ W
Let G
0 = G ∪ {o,o}
Let J(G
0) = ∅
Let W = W ∪ {G}
W now contains all achievable bundles of the kind {o,o}
Repeat
Let G be a bundle in W
For each element a ∈ G
Let R ⊆ T be the set of rules having a as head
For each r ∈ R
Let D be the body of r
Let G
0 = G
S
D\{a}
If G
0\O 6= ∅ then break; G’ is an invalid bundle
Let J(G
0) = J(G
0)
S
{(G,r)}
Let W = W
S
G
0\G
Let X = X
S
G
Until W = ∅
X now contains all the candidate bundles with their justiﬁca-
tions. This section of the algorithm is guaranteed to terminate be-
cause of the assumption that continuing to apply production rules
to a bundle will never result in the original bundle, made in 4.1.
We now compute the valuations for the bundles from their justi-
ﬁcations
Repeat
Let G ∈ X s.t. ∀(G
0,r) ∈ J(G),G
0not ∈ X
4
If J(G) = ∅ then Let V (G) = 0
Else
V (G) = max(G0,r)∈J(G)(V (G
0) − c(r))
; where c(r) is the cost associated to the rule r
; notice that V (G
0) has been assigned, since G
0not ∈ X
Let X = X\{G}
Let C = C
S
{G}
Until X = ∅
At this point C is the candidate set and for each candidate bundle
a valuation has been assigned.
4.5 Worked Example
To illustrate how this analysis operates, we return to the Freight-
Mixer scenario described in §3. Based on past histories of similar
auctions to the ones that were selected during the matchmaking
phase, Freightmixer creates beliefs about the expected distribution
of closing prices of these auctions. In addition, Freightmixer cre-
ates beliefs about the expected distribution of the two reverse auc-
tions it is considering participating in. These are represented iden-
tically to the forward auctions, but as having negative prices. This
represents the fact that Freightmixer will receive money if they win
the auction.
We assume that the closing prices are uniformly distributed over
the following sets:
a : {40,45,...,135,140}
b : {20,25,...,95,100}
c : {130,135,140,145,150}
d : {50,55,...,105,110}
e : {80,85,...,115,120}
f : {30,35,...,65,70}
g : {20,25,...,135,140}
h : {70,75,80,85,90}
la : {−250,−240,...,−200,−190}
sfo : {−220,−210,−200,−190,−180}
(9)
Before bidding begins, the agent holds no bids. We assume that
the current price function q0 lies just below all of the above prices.
The agent has a set of production rules, representing the graph
in ﬁgure 1. For the purposes of this example, we assume that the
cost of composing is zero, and hence do not annotate the rules with
costs:
sfo ⇐ {a,b}
sfo ⇐ {c}
ord ⇐ {e}
ord ⇐ {d}
sfo ⇐ {ord,f}
la ⇐ {ord,g}
la ⇐ {sfo,h}
(10)
Using the algorithm described above, we can apply equation (5)
to evaluate the expected cost/beneﬁt of participating in any set of
forward and reverse auctions, which allows us to determine the
set that has the optimal expected payoff. In this case the set is
{d,g,c,sfo,la}. It has an expected purchase cost of 80 + 80 +
4Again, G is guaranteed to exist if X 6= ∅ by the assumption in
4.1.140 − 200 − 220 = −120. Hence, participating in these auctions
and committing to purchase the complete bundle gives an expected
payoff of 120. The agent therefore will place initial bids in these
ﬁve auctions.
Let us now assume that the auctions have progressed, so that
auctiong nowhasaleadingbidof105heldbyanotherparty(giving
an expected purchase price of 125) and we hold auction c with a
bid of 130 (still giving an expected purchase price of 140). Let us
explore the algorithm’s behavior in two different cases.
Firstly, assume reverse auction la has a leading offer of 210 held
by another party. This gives an expected closing price of 195 if
we continue to participate in it. Hence, the expected proﬁt of the
bundle we are currently pursuing is now 50. Can we do better than
this? Clearly we can, as the proﬁt from the sub-bundle {c,sfo}
is 60, and we only hold a bid in auction c, so there is no risk in
withdrawing from the others. Applying equation (8) to the various
alternatives shows that this is indeed the optimal bundle to commit
to now: There is no way of proﬁtably satisfying la, hence we no
longer pursue this aim. If we held no bids in any auction, equation
(5) shows that we would choose to bid for the bundle {f,d,sfo},
giving an expected proﬁt of 70. However, equation (8) gives an
expected proﬁt of 44. The additional cost of de-committing from
auction c and hence risking accidental purchase is not worth the
potential gain of swapping to a different bundle.
Now if we assume that we hold the leading offer of 210 in la,
giving an expected closing price of 200 if we continue to partic-
ipate in it. The expected proﬁt of the current bundle is therefore
55, which is still less than the expected proﬁt (according to (5)) of
the sub-bundle c,sfo. However, applying equation (8) tells us that
we shouldn’t switch to this bundle. The probability of us acciden-
tally winning la is 1/3, resulting in us receiving a payment of 210
but needing to purchase la from a ﬁxed-price competitor at mar-
ket value, that for the sake of the example we supposed to be 260.
The expected cost of this risk (16.7) is signiﬁcantly higher than the
beneﬁt of de-committing (5), so we should not do so.
However, applying the production rules and equation (8) to alter-
native options shows that there is a better alternative. Rather than
using c to generate sfo, it can be used together with h to generate
la at an expected cost of 200. f and d can then be used to gener-
ate sfo in a more cost-effective way. Hence, the optimal bundle
to commit to now is {c,h,la,f,d,sfo}. This gives an expected
proﬁt of 70.
These examples demonstrate the different ways in which the al-
gorithm can react to situations. It will often remain bidding for a
certain bundle of goods and contracts. However, if this is no longer
expected to be optimal according to equation (8), it will adopt an al-
ternative approach. This may involve withdrawing from part of the
bundle by de-committing from a reverse auction together with as-
sociated forward auctions. Alternatively, it may involve remaining
committed to all reverse auctions but adjusting the set of forward
auctions being used to purchase the required components. Finally,
it may involve withdrawing completely from all auctions. At each
stage, its decision is determined by its estimate of the expected util-
ity of pursuing different options.
5. RELATED WORK
Research into automated negotiation has long been an impor-
tant part of distributed AI and multi-agent systems. Initially it fo-
cused primarily on negotiation in collaborative problem solving, as
a means towards improving coordination of multiple agents work-
ing together on a common task. [12] provide an overview of the
pioneering work in this area. As electronic commerce became in-
creasingly important, the work expanded to encompass situations
with agents representing individuals or businesses with potentially
conﬂicting interests. The Contract Net [25] provides an early archi-
tecture for the distribution of contracts and subcontracts to suppli-
ers. It uses a form of distributed request-for-proposals. However,
it does not discuss algorithms for determining what price to ask in
a proposal. [11] use a more sophisticated negotiation protocol to
allow the subcontracting of aspects of a business process to third
parties. This is primarily treated as a one-to-one negotiation prob-
lem, and various heuristic algorithms for negotiation in this context
are discussed in [5]. Other work in one-to-one negotiation includes
the game-theoretic approach of [22] and the logic-based argumen-
tation approach of [16].
Work has also focussed on effective algorithms for use in many-
to-many negotiation environments such as a double auction. Gjer-
stad and Dickhaut [7] use a belief-based modelling approach to
generate appropriate bids and offers. Their work is close in spirit to
ours, in that it combines belief-based learning of individual agents’
bidding strategies with utility analysis. However, it is applied to a
single double auction marketplace, and does not allow agents to bid
in a variety of auctions. Subsequent to this pioneering work, others
have directly improved this approach [29] or worked on alternative
algorithms in a similar environment. These include heuristic ap-
proaches ([4],[21]), stochastic analysis ([14],[15]), fuzzy logic [9]
and dynamic programming [28]. Work has also been carried out to
distribute [13] and generalise [20] the environment.
In addition to work on participation in a single many-to-many
double auction, researchers have developed algorithms able to par-
ticipate in many auctions simultaneously ([6], [17], [18], [10], [2],
[1], [3]). These algorithms differ from the work presented here in
that they focus on the purchase of one or more homogenous goods
from multiple auctions, whereas we present an algorithm for the
simultaneous purchase of component services and sale of one or
more composite services in an auction environment. Schillo et. al
[24] analyse task assignment in contract nets. They consider the
problem of potential overcommitment by a supplier to several con-
tractors caused by the delay between a supplier making an offer and
the contractor selecting a supplier. This problem is related to that of
overpurchasing in multiple auctions. The approach they take does
not balance the utility of success against the risk of overcommit-
ment, but instead tries to maintain the probability of overcommit-
ment below a certain threshold.
Work has been carried out on the problem of simultaneous pur-
chase of heterogeneous component services in an auction environ-
ment in response to a request for a composite service. Most no-
tably, the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) ([30]) presents a prob-
lem where an agent must participate in several simultaneous auc-
tions to purchase ﬂights, accommodation and entertainment. Suc-
cessful agents in this competition include ATTac ([26],[27]) and
SouthamptonTAC [8]. The work presented in this paper differs
from these in that it tackles a more generic version of the problem,
where the utility of the buyers is not known. Unlike the TAC, both
buyers and sellers must be simultaneously negotiated with through
forward and reverse auctions. The algorithm we present is a gener-
alization of that in [19], which focused only on forward auctions.
An alternative approach is to attempt to provide the right mar-
ket mechanism in the ﬁrst place, providing a centralized point of
contact for all buyers and sellers to trade. Sandholm [23] proposes
a sophisticated marketplace able to handle combinatorial bidding,
and able to provide guidance to buyers and sellers as to which mar-ket mechanism to adopt for a particular negotiation. In the long
term, as the different auction houses merge or fold and only a few
remain, this approach will be ideal. In the short term, we expect
improved market dynamics will occur through autonomous agents
in multiple auctions.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In the future, service composition will play an essential role in
e-commerce. Composite service products will be created on the ﬂy
in response to customer requests. In this paper, we have focused on
the key problem of effective negotiation for service composition,
and presented the speciﬁcation of an algorithm to perform this task.
The algorithm is able to participate simultaneously in request-for-
quotesreverseauctionstowincontractsforcompositeservices, and
in English auctions to purchase the components necessary. It is
also able to make ﬁxed-price purchases. To do this it chooses a
set of forward and reverse auctions to participate in, and constantly
re-evaluates this choice to determine if it is worth switching to a
different set. It is able to trade off the risk of accidentally making
purchases during this switching process against the beneﬁt gained
from a new set.
We have presented two forms of the algorithm - one which is
more exact, the other which is more efﬁcient. We hope to carry
out experiments to determine if the simplifying assumptions in the
latter algorithm still give good performance, and to explore alter-
native simplifying techniques to yield an algorithm which is both
efﬁcient and effective. We also plan to extend the algorithm to han-
dle other forms of negotiation, in particular one-to-one negotiation,
and to apply the techniques of [3] to handle various auction types
with staggered opening times.
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